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TRANSFORMING HISTORY IN THE 
POSTMODERN ERA 
G. Edward White* 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS 
OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY. By Morton J. Horwitz. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 1992. Pp. ix, 361. $30. 
The appearance of Morton Horwitz' The Transformation of Ameri-
can Law 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy 1 is an instructive 
episode for students and practitioners of legal history. The book is a 
sequel to Horwitz' influential The Transformation of American Law, 
1780-1860, which first appeared in 1977. Sequels are relatively com-
mon in the historical profession. Much rarer is a self-conscious 
change by the historian from one methodological framework to an-
other in the process of writing a sequel. When the author associates 
that change with "the massive challenge to traditional ideas of histori-
cal explanation that ha[s] invaded both the worlds of theory and his-
torical practice since Transformation [I] was written,"2 an invitation is 
implicitly tendered to explore the relationship between the structure of 
Horwitz' historical narrative and contemporary historiographical 
culture. 
In the course of my discussion of Horwitz, I will first contrast 
Transformation II with Transformation L a book that appeared when 
the discipline oflegal history, and the field oflegal scholarship, were at 
a markedly different stage in their twentieth-century history. I will 
then tum to three central features of Transformation IL· its methodol-
ogy, the structure of Horwitz' historical narrative, and the metapoliti-
cal strategies driving the book. An exploration of those features, I 
believe, will lead us to confront the dilemmas historians currently face. 
I. "A VERY DIFFERENT BOOK" 
Horwitz begins Transformation II by noting what any reader of 
• University Professor and John B. Minor Professor of Law and History, University of Vir-
ginia. My thanks to Kimberly Willoughby for research assistance. 
Since this review was written, I have seen two other excellent reviews of this book, which 
arrived too late for me to take advantage of their insights. See Daniel R. Ernst, The Critical 
Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History, 102 YALE L.J. 1019 (1993); John H. Schle-
gel, A Tasty Tidbit, 41 BUFF. L. REV. (forthcoming 1993). 
1. Morton J. Horwitz is Charles Warren Professor of American Legal History, Harvard 
University. 
2. P. vii. I refer to the new book in the text as Transformation IL 
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the book and its predecessor will immediately grasp: while the sequel 
"tak[ es] up the story of the history of American law as I left it in 
[I'ransformation I], . . . [I'ransformation II] is a very different book" 
(p. vii). This is not to say that the books are radically inconsistent. A 
dust jacket comment by Stanley Katz says that "Morton Horwitz has 
one subject- the relationship oflaw to politics in American history." 
One could refine that statement to say that Horwitz' subject in Trans-
formation I and Transformation II is the continuing effort by members 
of the legal profession to effectuate a sharp separation between law and 
politics, so that law appears as a neutral, nonpolitical, transcendent 
entity, symbolized in the phrase a government of laws rather than men. 
In both books Horwitz is concerned with penetrating successive struc-
tures of legal thought that the legal community has enlisted in support 
of this effort to separate law from politics and with exposing the effort 
for the ideological enterprise that it has been. 
One cannot read a Horwitzian narrative of historical events, then, 
without noticing the many examples of this effort to separate law from 
politics, in such "official" forms of legal discourse as common law 
cases, treatises, and other commentary. Nor can one miss the author's 
attitude toward the purported separation of law and politics, which 
ranges from skepticism through censure to outrage. The overwhelm-
ing message of Horwitzian historical narrative is that to deny the in-
terrelationship between law and politics is to deny one of the essential 
features of American culture. 
Thus, at one level, Transformation II "takes up the story" of 
Transformation I as Horwitz "left it" and tells it all over again. But, 
as we will see, the form of Horwitz' narrative is strikingly different in 
the second volume, and the differences - ranging from source materi-
als to the theory of historiography practiced in the two books - are so 
patent and multifaceted that they distract the reader from any overrid-
ing similarities. Much of this review, in fact, will concentrate on dif-
ferences before returning to the theme of Horwitz' unifying vision. 
Well before Transformation II appeared there were hints, explicit 
and implicit, that it would be "a very different book" from Trans-
formation L A long time passed between publication of the two 
books, and during that interval significant changes occurred in the 
field of American legal history and in Horwitz' own career. Transfor-
mation I appeared at a time when American legal history, as a mod-
ern scholarly field, was in its relative infancy. Aside from the im-
portant works of Willard Hurst,3 Mark DeWolfe Howe,4 George 
3. E.g., JAMES W. HURST, THE GROWfH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS (1950); 
JAMES w. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDmONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
UNITED STATES (1956); JAMES W. HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS IN UNITED STATES 
HISTORY (1960). 
4. MARK D. HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE SHAPING YEARS 1841-
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Haskins, 5 and a few others, 6 American legal history was a scholarly 
wasteland from the Second World War to the 1970s. Transformation 
I was one of several books appearing in the 1970s that helped give the 
field a scholarly identity and make it respectable among both legal 
scholars and what Horwitz called "general" historians. 7 By the time 
of Transformation I's publication, a number of major law schools had 
hired faculty members whose primary scholarly interest was in legal 
history. Joint degree programs sponsored concurrently by law schools 
and history departments were also in place at several universities. The 
consequence was that Transformation I reached a scholarly commu-
nity of sufficient size and stature to publicize it. 
Indeed, the appearance of Transformation I at a time when mod-
em American legal history was "coming of age" had some effects that 
Horwitz may not have anticipated. Given the chronology of legal-
historian appointments to law school faculties and history depart-
ments, Horwitz' status as a tenured professor at Harvard, and the self-
conscious formation of a legal-historian community of scholars in the 
1970s, Transformation I would probably have received a significant 
amount of attention had it been a bland, cautious book. But it was far 
from that. It was one of the first "critical" scholarly efforts to seek to 
reach a large scholarly audience. In Transformation L changes in the 
doctrinal superstructure of American private law were not portrayed 
as accidental or autonomous or even as simply reflective of changes in 
society at large. They appeared as the conscious efforts of powerful 
elites - including segments of the bar, the judiciary, and commercial 
interests - to shape legal doctrine so as to further their particularistic 
goals. That the elites were not identified with much precision - that 
Horwitz' analysis was not "sociological," but was conducted at the 
levels of theory or doctrine - seemed to make the narrative of Trans-
formation I all the more sinister. It was as if Horwitz had seen 
through the obfuscating rhetoric of "neutral" doctrine to expose the 
fact that doctrinal change in the early nineteenth century invariably 
favored those in power. 
The audience for Transformation I was particularly suited to re-
ceive its message. The 1970s had not only brought persons with a 
serious interest in legal history onto law faculties and history depart-
1870 (1957); MARK D. HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE PROVING YEARS 
1870-1882 (1963). 
5. GEORGE C. HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETIS (1960). 
6. Notably LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE 
SHAW (1957). 
7. "It has been my ardent desire to reach the general historian," Horwitz wrote in the intro-
duction to MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at xi 
(1977). I refer to this book in the text as Transformation L In this effort he succeeded beyond 
expectations, winning the Bancroft Prize for 1978, an award for "general" books in American 
history given by a committee of professional historians. 
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ments; those years had also brought into tenured and tenure-track po-
sitions persons who had been undergraduates in the 1960s. A number 
of those persons regarded themselves as politically left, and in the mid-
1970s some of them became involved in what came to be called the 
critical legal studies movement. Of the original "founders" of CLS, 
several regarded themselves as serious legal historians, and the early 
scholarship of other prominent "crits," such as Duncan Kennedy, was 
historically oriented. 8 
Horwitz was himself active in CLS, and between the early 1970s, 
when he first entered law teaching, and the publication of Transforma-
tion L his historical scholarship took on a distinctly critical bite. Some 
of the chapters in Transformation I reflected work that Horwitz had 
begun much earlier. His original frame of reference had been more 
that of the social historian, examining legal doctrine in the context of 
changing social conditions. 9 In Transformation I those chapters were 
woven into the polemical superstructure of the work, which empha-
sized elite manipulation of doctrinal rules and categories. 
The "critical" dimensions of Transformation I made it a source of 
excitement and inspiration for a number of legal historians who re-
garded historical scholarship as part of a larger critical project. Those 
dimensions also stimulated others in the field, who were unsympa-
thetic either to "critical" politics or to Horwitz' methodology, to at-
tack the book. The result was that reviews ranged from extremely 
praiseworthy to extremely unreceptive, and Horwitz became some-
thing of an academic celebrity. 
With the exception of reviewers who attacked the entire vision of 
historical scholarship allegedly embodied in Transformation L 10 nega-
tive reviews tended to focus on Horwitz' analysis of specific common 
law fields, arguing that he had misrepresented or distorted the cases 
that he had used as supporting evidence and that more careful or com-
plete readings would reveal a doctrinal picture less consistent with his 
larger claims.11 The collective assessment of these reviews was that 
the book was a provocative thesis in search of evidence, resting more 
8. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. 
L. REV. 1685 (1976); Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. 
L. REv. 209 (1979). See generally John H. Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, 
and Affectionate History of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 391 
(1984). 
9. The first edition of Lawrence Friedman's A History of American Law, published in 1973, 
was firmly in this mode of "social history." In Friedman's model of the relationship between law 
and its social context, law simply "reflected," or was "a mirror of" society. "Nothing [about 
legal doctrine]," Friedman felt, was "autonomous." LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN LAW 10 (1973). 
10. See, e.g., Peter R. Teachout, Light in Ashes: The Problem of "Respect for the Rule of 
Law" in American Legal History, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 241 (1978) (reviewing HORWITZ, supra 
note 7). 
11. See Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A 
Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717 (1981) (reviewing HORWITZ, supra note 7); A.W.B. Simp-
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on rhetoric and passion than on fact. The reviews were in one sense 
guilty of faulting Horwitz for not doing something he had not sought 
to do. In Transformation I, Horwitz' analysis did not aspire to dense-
ness, complexity, and comprehensiveness; rather, it operated at a level 
of inarticulate and unselfconscious rhetoric. His methods had been 
those of the intellectual historian, although his claims appeared to 
have sociological content.12 
Still, the critical reviews must have given Horwitz pause about his 
methodological format. Was Horwitz' analysis truly "sociological', in 
the sense that he was claiming the existence of actual "alliances" or 
other relationships between "merchants," lawyers, and judges?13 If so, 
he had provided precious little evidence on any such relationships. Or 
was it something else: a recognition of a consciousness in legal doc-
trine that reflexively identified "principled" rules as those that pro-
moted security and predictability among persons whom those rules 
regularly affected? If the latter, this was the stuff of intellectual his-
tory, unencumbered by quantitative sociological analysis. Precisely 
how many lawyers and judges had formed actual "alliances" with 
"merchants" was of little consequence if those charged with the for-
mulation of commercial law doctrine had an outlook on the world that 
was amenable to mercantile interests. Moreover, the fact that some 
cases did not reflect those interests did not mean that judges failed to 
consider them or deem them important. 
Horwitz had not identified his perspective in Transformation I as 
that of the intellectual historian, primarily concerned with conscious-
ness as distinguished from extralegal phenomena. The reasons for his 
failure to clarify this dimension of his methodology very probably had 
to do with the state of legal historiography and of "critical" thought at 
the time. In the modem infancy of legal history, its practitioners 
made a serious effort to distinguish themselves from an older discipline 
of "constitutional history." Their focus was on private law subjects, 
ordinary cases, and the relationship of private law to what Horwitz 
called "economic change."14 Horwitz' assumption that 
"[c]onstitutional law ... had been overstudied both in terms of its 
impact on the development of the American economy and in terms of 
its representative character" was widely shared by those who entered 
son, The Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 533 (1979) (reviewing 
HORWITZ, supra note 7). 
12. Alfred S. Konefsky, Law and Culture in Antebellum Boston, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1119 
(1988), has an analysis that parallels mine here. 
13. In one passage in Transformation I Horwitz had written: 
As political and economic power shifted to merchant and entrepreneurial groups in the 
postrevolutionary period, they began to forge an alliance with the legal profession to ad-
vance their own interests through a transformation of the legal system. 
HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 253. 
14. See Horwitz' discussion in HORWITZ, supra note 7, at xii. 
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the field of legal history along with him. "By ... focusing on private 
law," he and his contemporaries believed, "we can study the more reg-
ular instances in which law, economy, and society interacted."15 
Horwitz was consciously adopting the perspective of the social as 
distinguished from the intellectual historian by eschewing constitu-
tional law and focusing on the relationship of private law to "eco-
nomic change." That perspective as applied to Horwitz' own work, 
however, created some methodological anomalies. By avoiding 
"great" constitutional cases, Horwitz was seeking to bypass the "ex-
ceptional" rhetoric of heavily contested issues of high politics. He was 
looking for the unremarkable, uncontested rhetoric of private law in 
order to observe social and economic assumptions in an unselfcon-
scious form. He may also have implicitly assumed that the rhetoric of 
law cases needed to be read skeptically, as generalized arguments 
masking more particular concerns, and that the "real" value of private 
law cases lay in their impact upon economic and political interests. 
There was thus an anti-idealist dimension to Horwitz' decision to 
concentrate on the relationship of private law to economic develop-
ment. But his analysis, throughout Transformation I, was conducted 
at the level of doctrine. He did not offer statistics on the uses of water-
ways or railroad ownership or commercial banking; he offered instead 
readings of cases involving water rights or torts or commercial trans-
actions. The "transformations" he identified were doctrinal changes. 
While he persistently claimed that those changes paralleled changes in 
the economy, he did not spend much time documenting the latter set 
of changes. This is not to say that his claims about the relationship 
between doctrinal and economic change were inaccurate, but simply 
that his analytical energy was directed principally toward the exercise 
of reading and interpreting legal ideas, as expressed in the form of 
private law doctrine. In short, in Transformation I Horwitz func-
tioned as an intellectual historian manque. 
There is another probable reason why Horwitz chose not to em-
phasize the intellectual history dimensions of his approach in Trans-
formation L Leftist thought in the American academy of the 1970s 
was still heavily influenced by neo-Marxist approaches to history; the 
work of the structuralists had not yet penetrated the consciousness of 
most practitioners. The neo-Marxist eschatology of the 1970s decid-
edly disfavored "idealist" perspectives, and "irrationalist" perspectives 
had not yet gained a foothold. Indeed, Horwitz' term instrumental-
ism, which he had borrowed from the social historians but had given a 
critical spin, was one that took the material world and its core themes 
- wealth, status, power - to be primary causative forces in history. 
Not only did Horwitz argue in Transformation I that legal doctrine 
was formulated for "instrumentalist" ends - that is, as an instrument 
15. Id. 
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to further the goals of interests seeking to gain or hold on to power -
his own approach to legal history was itself instrumentalist. He be-
lieved that the core themes of the material world drove the legal sys-
tem. Doctrinal change represented a playing out of those themes in 
the distinctive language of legal rhetoric. 
Thus, in Transformation I, Horwitz took pains to distinguish his 
form of doctrinal interpretation from the naive idealist versions of in-
tellectual history. His form, he suggested, was deeply rooted in the 
"real" materialist world. But when one explored Horwitz' analyses of 
the successive private law fields in which doctrinal "transformations" 
had taken place, one found a great deal of attention to the concepts, 
tests, distinctions, and formulas of doctrine, and not much attention, 
except at a very general level, to the sociological context of the cases 
and treatises Horwitz examined. This created an anomalous relation-
ship between Horwitz' "instrumentalist" vision and his exegesis. His 
vision suggested that doctrine should be read skeptically, with atten-
tion to which power-seeking interests gained and which lost with each 
doctrinal change; his exegesis assiduously "unpacked" the doctrine 
but declined to identify the interests in any detail. The result was a 
brilliant analysis of the intellectual dilemmas, contradictions, and me-
diating strategies that courts and commentators employed in succes-
sive private law fields, superimposed on which was a series of 
polemical claims about the transfer of wealth, status, and power in 
nineteenth-century legal and commercial America. 
Another way to describe the methodological tension in Transfor-
mation I would be to focus on the relationship between Horwitz' ana-
lytical apparatus and his operative theory of historical causation.16 
Horwitz' "unpacking" of doctrine in the fields of property, commer-
cial law, contracts, and torts repeatedly revealed historical "moments" 
when certain doctrinal principles, or the metatheoretical assumptions 
driving those principles, came to be perceived as awkward in their im-
plications for specific situations. Examples were the principle of vica-
rious liability in torts, which seemed inconsistent with the theory that 
the contractual relationships between the parties should control the 
responsibility of employers for injuries suffered by employees; pre-
scription in property law, which seemed inconsistent with the assump-
tion in early nineteenth-century thought that property rights should 
yield to the developing needs of the community; or the "just price" 
theory of contract formation, which seemed inconsistent with the mid-
nineteenth-century view that "value" in a contractual context should 
be a function of the marketplace and the "wills" of the contracting 
parties. 
Horwitz' explanation for these "moments" was uniformly located 
outside the legal system. The attack on prescriptive rights was part of 
16. See the discussion in Konefsky, supra note 12, at 1123-25. 
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"a movement to limit sharply the power of property owners to deter-
mine the scope of economic development."17 The evisceration of re-
spondeat superior in cases involving injuries to employees "arose in an 
economy which already had all but eradicated traces of an earlier 
model of normative relationships between master and servants," and 
thus reflected the fact that "the law had come simply to ratify those 
forms of inequality that the market system produced."18 "The devel-
opment of extensive markets at the turn of the [nineteenth] century 
contributed to a substantial erosion of belief in theories of objective 
value and just price."19 "[A] regime of markets and speculation," 
Horwitz argued, "was simply incompatible with a socially imposed 
standard of value."20 
In all these examples a "simple" model of causation was being em-
ployed: changes in the economy produced changes in legal doctrine. 
For all the prominence of "markets" in Horwitz' causal framework, 
however, his discussion of economic developments in Transformation 
I was strikingly sparse, especially when compared with his rich discus-
sion of doctrine. Indeed, a characteristic pattern of Horwitz' analysis 
of private law subjects was to posit "external" changes in nineteenth-
century American culture; then to detail, with considerable subtlety, 
changes in the conceptions of proprietary or contractual or commercial 
relationships that arguably paralleled those changes; and then to con-
clude with a "simple" causal explanation - the conceptions were a 
product of the external developments. 
This "simple" model of causation not only contrasted with the 
complexity of Horwitz' "unpacking" of doctrine; it raised analytical 
problems in its own right. If conceptual change was simply a function 
of external economic developments, how did Honvitz account for 
what his own work had richly documented: the extraordinary inca-
pacity of doctrinal writers and judges to modify existing doctrinal cate-
gories to alleviate the awkwardness of applying them in new contexts? 
Much of the "story" told in Horwitz' successive narratives of private 
law "transformations" involved the inability of existing categories to 
embrace new sets of social relationships, or at least to embrace them in 
a "satisfactory" fashion. In contract formation, for example, if the 
growth of markets had implications for the value of an item of ex-
change, making that value less objective, how could "just price" the-
ory determine whether the price of an item was "just"? Yet just price 
theory persisted in the face of the expanded marketing of goods and 
services until the fundamental assumption of just price theory, that the 
value of a bargained-for item was objective rather than subjective, was 
17. HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 45-46. 
18. Id. at 210. 
19. Id. at 180-81. 
20. Id. at 181. 
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abandoned. This was a "transformation" in the prevailing conception 
of contract formation. But it did not occur "simply" because of the 
emergence of markets of exchange. Indeed, the assumptions of just 
price theory persisted because those who had a hand in the formula-
tion of legal doctrine were unable to conceive of a subjective theory of 
value. 
In short, Horwitz' own analysis significantly complicated his own 
theories of causation. But in Transformation I he not only retained 
those theories; he stated them in stark, polemical form. One thus won-
dered why, if the external forces "causing" doctrinal change were so 
strong, they were resisted, indeed not even grasped, for so long.21 One 
wondered what were the sources of the numerous doctrinal anomalies, 
inconsistencies, and contradictions unearthed by Horwitz if law "sim-
ply" responded to economic change. 
Nonetheless, Horwitz had powerful reasons to adopt the "simple" 
approach to causation that he employed in Transformation L While 
his analysis may have focused largely on consciousness, he did not 
want to elevate ideas to a position of causal power. That would have 
smacked of idealism and broken ranks radically with a nee-Marxist 
perspective. Moreover, by retaining an uncomplicated polemical ex-
planatory structure that emphasized "markets," the economy, and the 
core themes of social history, Horwitz avoided identification with any 
of the tendencies of intellectual history, which was pictured in neo-
Marxist eschatology as evading the imperatives of the "real" material 
world. Finally, by emphasizing that his causal apparatus placed pri-
mary significance on the relationship between private law and eco-
nomic development, Horwitz associated himself with the cutting edge 
oflegal history scholarship in the 1970s. The enthusiasm for Transfor-
mation I in many quarters suggested that Horwitz' instincts had been 
sound. 
Shortly after the publication of Transformation L however, a re-
markable and unanticipated series of developments took place in legal 
scholarship, affecting not only legal historians, but "critical" scholars 
of a variety of disciplinary persuasions. Another repository of "criti-
cal" methodologies began to influence the community of American 
legal scholars - methodologies whose starting place was internal 
rather than external, focusing on structures of thought shared by in tel-
21. An earlier explanation for the phenomenon of "resistance," which managed to maintain 
the primacy of external (sociological) causation yet still accounted for the apparent inability of 
the legal system to respond quickly to external changes in the culture, was cultural lag. Accord-
ing to this explanation, the legal system was peculiarly slow to reflect changes in the larger 
culture, partly because of the specialized nature of the legal profession and partly because of the 
investment of professionals in the status quo. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, 
Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents, 67 CoLUM. L. REV. 50 (1967). This explana-
tion gave no attention to the phenomenon oflimits on the capacity of humans to embrace certain 
data within their consciousness - the "imprisoning" features of ideology. Changes in the larger 
culture may not be perceived by legal actors, given their consciousness, as "changes" at all. 
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lectual communities and not on developments in the larger culture in 
which those communities were situated. The methodologies empha-
sized the extent to which actors (even educated professional actors) 
situated at a given point in time were incapable of expanding their 
consciousnesses to contemplate certain intellectual options. The 
thought of such communities was "structured" by time, place, social 
status, and a host of other variables; the major effect of this structuring 
was an implicit set of cultural and ideological "boundaries" on the 
consciousness of actors within the communities. 
The emergence of this strand of thought had two major implica-
tions for the culture of American academics. First, structuralist meth-
odologies revived and recast intellectual history by treating the ideas 
of literate elites as one manifestation of the "sociology of knowledge." 
Instead of picturing intellectual history as an idealist escape from the 
"real" world, structuralists pictured it as another form, albeit a com-
plicated one, of sociological data. The "thought" of literate elites from 
the past became as important for what it did not include as for what it 
did: the options implicitly not exercised by a particular generation of 
scholars, the tacit presuppositions that excluded certain subjects from 
the realm of stature or worth. 
Second, structuralist methodologies were seen as having a power-
ful critical bite. As the "simple" causal explanations of a materialist 
explanatory perspective became increasingly troublesome, especially in 
their contemporary political implications, structuralist messages came 
to seem more congenial in the 1980s. One particular message of struc-
turalism began to resonate: because consciousness is inevitably impris-
oned by time and circumstance, collective ideological "solutions" are 
necessarily provisional and contingent. This gave enhanced meaning 
to the claim, which had distinct political implications in the 1980s, 
that "things could be otherwise." Structuralist history could reveal 
worlds in which positions were "unimaginable"; later worlds took 
those same positions to be commonplace. Such revelations under-
mined the status quo and invited relativism. 
The methodologies of structuralism had two other important ef-
fects that directly bore on Horwitz' own scholarship. First, they sig-
nificantly complicated questions of causation. "Simple" models of 
causal attribution not only assumed that priority could be assigned 
among competing "causal" phenomena in historical explanation; they 
assumed that causation was itself an objective, external phenomenon, 
separable from human consciousness. If market activity was the pri-
mary causal factor in shaping legal doctrine in the nineteenth century, 
that factor, according to such models, would be apparent to historians 
of a variety of persuasions, even those whose consciousnesses treated 
economic factors as incapable of having causal significance. Struc-
turalism suggested that such an approach, at some level, was naive. 
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Humans could not attribute significance to certain causal explanations 
if those explanations were treated as sufficiently "foreign" to penetrate 
consciousness. While the structuralist argument may have proved too 
much, because some causal explanations have endured over time bet-
ter than others, it nonetheless complicated the question of whether 
objective "causes" could ever be ascertained. Indeed, it suggested that 
the interplay between consciousness and data was sufficiently compli-
cated to undermine any pretense of objectivity in historical 
explanations. 
Second, structuralism suggested that a tacit preference for some 
historical subjects over others, such as private over constitutional law, 
was just that - a tacit preference, driven by the professional concerns 
of a community at a point in its history. There was nothing essentially 
rewarding in studying private law and economic development as op-
posed to constitutional law and the development of ideas. The choice 
to study one or the other was itself a function of consciousness. Thus, 
the limits Transformation I implicitly placed on itself were the limits 
of time and place, and not those of essentialist judgments. The ideol-
ogy of actors in the legal system at a given point in its history could be 
gleaned from any source. 
Horwitz was well aware of the emergence of structuralist method-
ologies in American academic life in the late 1970s and 1980s. One of 
the first scholai:ly groups to embrace structuralism was the CLS move-
ment. Indeed, in the early 1980s a methodological split between "in-
strumentalists" and "irrationalists" developed within CLS, and 
Horwitz' work was cited as an example of "instrumentalist" scholar-
ship. Horwitz himself participated in methodological debates within 
CLS, conceding that at the heart of the division between "instrumen-
talists" and "irrationalists" lay the question of the legitimacy of exter-
nal or objective theories of causation.22 In those debates Horwitz 
described himself as wanting to retain some "real world" materialist 
emphasis in scholarship, notwithstanding the difficulties in separating 
what was "real" from what one perceived reality to be. 
The impact of these changes on the perspective Horwitz adopted in 
Transformation I was considerable, as certain passages in his preface 
to Transformation II demonstrate. After characterizing Transforma-
tion II as a "very different book" from its predecessor, Horwitz seeks 
to specify "the source of the change in emphasis" between Transfor-
mation I and Transformation IL That change derives, he says, "from 
the massive challenge to traditional ideas of historical explanation that 
have invaded both the worlds of theory and historical practice since 
Transformation [I] was written" (p. vii). He then identifies those 
changes as having involved "the disintegration of the nineteenth-cen-
22. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Decline of Objective Causation, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 
(David Kairys ed., 1982). 
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tury conception of explanation in the natural as well as the social and 
historical sciences." That conception of explanation placed emphasis 
on "general laws of history, change, and social progress," "predictive 
statements" derived from those laws, and "objective" theories of cau-
sation. In "explaining" historical events, then, one posited alternative 
general "covering laws" that "explained" historical phenomena, dis-
covered the "facts" of a given historical episode, and then applied the 
covering laws to the facts so as to assert a "single-factor 'chain[ ] of 
causation.' " That process produced a historical explanation that was 
deemed "objective" (pp. vii-viii). 
The nineteenth-century model of explanation, with its centerpiece 
of objective causation, has disintegrated, Horwitz believes, as "the sep-
aration between fact and value as the basis for value-free social science 
or history has been drawn into question," and "intense skepticism 
about the nineteenth-century working assumption that causation was 
objective" has "begun dramatically to undermine the claimed objectiv-
ity of explanation" (p. viii). The result has been a "new cult of com-
plexity," emphasizing "highly specific 'thick description' in which 
narratives and stories purport to substitute for traditional general the-
ories" of historical phenomena (pp. vii-viii). 
Horwitz has accepted "multi-factored complexity" as a method-
ological baseline in Transformation IL But he retreats from an aban-
donment of objectivity as a scholarly ideal. "[T]he book constantly 
wavers," he notes, "between, on the one hand, conventional efforts at 
historical explanation that continue to derive from nineteenth-century 
models of objectivity, and, on the other hand, the recognition that 
modernism has challenged the objectivity of these forms in many dif-
ferent ways" (p. ix). 
When one reflects on the implications of Horwitz' statement that 
Transformation II is a "very different book" from its predecessor, in 
light of the characterization of Transformation I previously advanced, 
three themes command further attention. First, the historiographical 
status of Transformation I as firmly in a genre of "social" history, pri-
vate law, and "materialist" metatheory, taken together with Horwitz' 
statement, invites the reader to consider what features of that genre 
have been abandoned in Transformation IL Second, the unusual jux-
taposition in Horwitz' preface between "cultural factors" and "social 
context," coupled with his discussion of the disintegration of tradi-
tional theories of historical explanation, suggests that he has associ-
ated "social history" with "single-factor" causation and seeks to 
prevent that association with respect to his own work. One wonders 
why. Finally, Horwitz' statement that he has not entirely abandoned 
traditional "objective" causation in Transformation fl despite his em-
brace of "multi-factor complexity," suggests that he is somewhat anx-
ious about the implications of giving up the perspectives of social 
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history. Again, one wonders why. With these themes in place, I now 
turn to the methodological and narrative structure of Transformation 
IL 
II. THE METHODOLOGICAL APPARATUS OF TRANSFORMATION II 
I have suggested that, for reasons having to do with the state of 
legal history as a scholarly field in the 1970s, Transformation I was a 
work of intellectual history manque - a work that, while directing its 
analytical energy principally toward the unpacking of doctrinal rheto-
ric and commentary, nonetheless implied at every point in the analysis 
that legal language was "instrumentalist" in character, masking the 
"real," sociologically driven motivations of legal actors. The sociolog-
ical messages of Transformation I were taken seriously. In fact, most 
of the criticism of the book came from commentators who argued that 
Horwitz' treatment of cases had been distorted in order to make his 
evidence conform to his sociological readings. Most commentators 
appeared to accept Horwitz' "instrumentalist" approach to legal texts; 
they simply disagreed with him about whether the cases he had con-
sidered supported his particular sociological claims. 
In Transformation IL Horwitz' approach toward his source mate-
rial appears to be strikingly different. First, the material upon which 
he focuses is different in degree, and arguably in kind, from the mate-
rial that formed the basis of Transformation L In the first book, Hor-
witz focused heavily on cases as well as commentary and on many 
occasions appeared to be using cases as "representative" of doctrinal 
changes in the law. These changes were then given a sociological ex-
planation. Consider the following paragraphs from the first volume: 
The nineteenth century departure from the equitable conception of 
contract is particularly obvious in the rapid adoption of the doctrine of 
caveat emptor .... It was only after Lord Mansfield declared in 1778 ... 
that the only basis for an action for breach of warranty was an express 
contract, that the foundation was laid for reconsidering whether an ac-
tion for breach of an implied warranty would lie. In 1802 the English 
courts finally considered the policies behind such an action, declaring 
that no suit on an implied warranty would be allowed. Two years later, 
in the leading American case of Seixas v. Woods, the New York Supreme 
Court, relying on a doubtfully reported seventeenth century English 
case, also held that there could be no recovery against a merchant who 
could not be proved knowingly to have sold defective goods. Other 
American jurisdictions quickly fell into line. 
The development of extensive markets at the tum of the century con-
tributed to a substantial erosion of belief in theories of objective value 
and just price. Markets for future delivery of goods were difficult to 
explain within a theory of exchange based on giving and receiving 
equivalents in value. Futures contracts for fungible commodities could 
only be understood in terms of a fluctuating conception of expected 
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value radically different from the static notion that lay behind contracts 
for specific goods; a regime of markets and speculation was simply in-
compatible with a socially imposed standard of value. The rise of a mod-
em law of contract, then, was an outgrowth of an essentially 
procommercial attack on the theory of objective value which lay at the 
foundation of the eighteenth century's equitable idea of contract.23 
The above passage is characteristic of the methodology of Trans-
formation L The existence of a historical doctrine is derived from a 
"leading case" and a summary statement that "[o]ther ... jurisdic-
tions ... fell into line" in support of the position of that leading case; 
Horwitz then explains the doctrine's emergence by reference to extra-
legal phenomena, such as "the development of extensive markets." 
Extralegal phenomena affect legal "conceptions" and "ideas," such as 
the "equitable idea of contract." When such phenomena are "incom-
patible" with prevailing conceptions, the conceptions change. A "re-
gime of markets and speculation" was "incompatible with a socially 
imposed standard of value." Hence, the standard changed and with it 
legal doctrine. Thus, Horwitz promotes "simple" understandings of 
the observed incompatibility - and therefore the doctrinal change -
through his reliance on the single-factor model of "objective" 
causation. 
Horwitz' source materials in Transformation II are arguably simi-
lar, but his approach to those materials differs noticeably. Transfor-
mation I made frequent use of legal commentary, but it had been 
interspersed with case analysis. The paragraphs quoted above typified 
Horwitz' treatment of cases, which he presented as embodying stages 
in the history of doctrine. In Transformation IL Horwitz expands his 
use of commentary and virtually abjures cases as "representative" doc-
uments. In their place is attention to legal doctrine, as there was in 
Transformation L· but doctrine occupies quite a different methodologi-
cal "place" in Transformation IL To understand Horwitz' new use of 
doctrine, we must consider in some detail the conceptual apparatus 
that informs the book. 
Horwitz began Transformation I with a chapter, "The Emergence 
of an Instrumental Conception of Law," that set the stage for many of 
that book's claims. Central to the chapter was Horwitz' assertion that 
"[i]n eighteenth century America, common law rules were not re-
garded as instruments of social change," but in the nineteenth century 
"judges came to play a central role in directing the course of social 
change."24 That assertion was one of the most severely criticized fea-
tures of the book, but it was consistent with Horwitz' interest in fash-
ioning sociological explanations for doctrinal change - with the 
23. HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 180-81. 
24. Id. at 1. 
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mechanism for the explanation being an "objective" causal relation-
ship between legal doctrine and extralegal phenomena. 
In contrast, Transformation II begins with a chapter entitled "The 
Structure of Classical Legal Thought, 1870-1905." Included in the 
chapter are discussions of "Legal Architecture," "The Distinction be-
tween Public and Private Law," "The Creation of Increasingly Ab-
stract and General Classifications," "The Structure of Legal 
Reasoning," and "The Categorical Mind." The chapter, in short, is an 
exercise in unpacking the metatheoretical assumptions driving legal 
analytics, as practiced by courts and commentators. As Horwitz puts 
it: 
Between 1870 and 1900, one sees everywhere [a] tendency to genera-
lize and systematize fields of law that had previously been conceived of 
as a series of special cases and particular rules. This reorganization of 
legal architecture can be understood as an effort to create a systematic 
and autonomous system of private law derived from concepts such as 
will, fault (that is, the impairment of will), and property. It strove to 
erect an abstract set of legal categories that would subordinate particular 
legal relationships to a general system of classification. [p. 14] 
Much of Horwitz' discussion in the chapter involves what he calls 
"internal changes in the structure of legal ideas" (p. 11). This empha-
sis takes him far afield from his methodological orientation in Trans-
formation L In that book he implicitly denied that changes in legal 
ideas were "internal" at all. They were "simply" and inevitably re-
sponses to extralegal phenomena. In Transformation IL the changes 
are not only "internal" in the sense of professionally self-contained 
and autonomous; they do not track sociological developments in a 
"simple" fashion. At bottom, Horwitz argues, the nineteenth-century 
drive to purify and "integrate" legal doctrine in ever more abstract 
categories was motivated by a desire to achieve a radical separation 
between the realms oflaw and politics, with "law" achieving a neutral, 
"scientific," nonpolitical status. This desire was, of course, politically 
derived in the sense that it was precipitated by longstanding concerns 
about the "tyranny of majority" that would result should the legal 
system become openly politicized (p. 9). But it was not precipitated by 
the particularistic, "instrumentalist" concerns that Transformation I 
had pictured as motivating legal actors. Indeed, the beliefs that drove 
nineteenth-century Americans to seek a radical separation of the 
realms of law and politics were so deeply and consensually held, Hor-
witz suggests, that they transcended "instrumentalist" concerns. 
Thus, at the beginning of Transformation IL Horwitz outlines a 
methodological approach and a nascent view of causation in legal his-
tory that seem dramatically at odds with those employed in Transfor-
mation L Yet the materials of the chapter are familiar ones: treatise 
literature, commentary, legal doctrine. However, when one sees how 
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Horwitz treats doctrine, the radical methodological contrast between 
Transformation I and Transformation II becomes apparent. 
In Transformation L I have noted, doctrine - while unpacked in 
the manner of the intellectual historian - was ultimately explained 
"instrumentally" and sociologically, as a response to extralegal phe-
nomena. Doctrinal change provided documentation of the law's re-
sponsiveness to its social context. In Transformation IL doctrine is 
overwhelmed by the "architecture" of legal categorizing. Consider 
Horwitz' list of a number of familiar late nineteenth-century doctrines: 
"direct" versus "indirect" taxation or application of the commerce 
power; "business affected with a public interest"; "intervening" and 
"superseding" causes of injury and harm; eminent domain powers em-
ployed for, or not for, "public purposes" (pp. 17-18). His purpose in 
invoking and discussing these doctrines is not to show that in particu-
lar cases they were used "instrumentally" in order to conform the law 
to the demands of markets or other extralegal phenomena. His pur-
pose is, rather, to show that their formulation presumed a bright-line, 
categorical approach to legal disputes in which the identification of 
relevant legal categories and the classification of disputes as governed 
by one category or another substituted for an approach in which com-
peting "interests" were "balanced." Doctrine thus serves not social 
forces but "architecture." 
Even more striking is the implicit theory of causal explanation that 
underlies Horwitz' treatment of doctrine. The use of bright-line doc-
trinal categories is not to serve any short-run "political" end. Rather, 
it fosters the image of law as a realm above and distinct from politics, 
in which categorical distinctions are made because they are "neutral, 
natural, and necessary" - in other words, because "everyone" accepts 
and consents to them (p. 270). The image of nineteenth-century legal 
architecture fostered by Horwitz' analysis is one of a self-contained, 
autonomous, professional subculture, largely insulated from the world, 
around it. Indeed, Horwitz suggests that the drive for categorization 
as an end in itself became so strong that "the process of integration 
gradually eliminated a series of built-in 'mediation' devices that had 
allowed various contradictory principles and doctrines to coexist with-
out totally consuming each other" (p. 15). Property, for example, 
which had originally been given a physicalist definition, was abstracted 
and expanded to become a category that included future expectations 
as well as uses, so that any governmental activity absurdly "was ren-
dered capable of being regarded as a taking" (p. 15). In such instances 
doctrinal development was not only not responsive to its social con-
text, it even came to operate in the face of that context. 
Horwitz' views of the relationship among theory, doctrine, and so-
cial change in Transformation II thus appear to deviate radically from 
the views he expressed in Transformation L But his views are not 
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consistent throughout the second book. Consider Horwitz' treatment 
of the case of Santa Clara v. Sou them Pacific Railroad Co., 25 in which 
the Supreme Court declared for the first time, without even hearing 
argument on the point, that corporations were "persons" within the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Pro-
tection Clauses. Commentators have regularly treated the Santa 
Clara case as a prominent example of the responsiveness of law to 
changes in the economy. The Court's holding that corporations were 
entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection has been seen as a rec-
ognition of the increased significance of the corporate form in the late 
nineteenth-century American economy, and even as a signal that the 
Court wanted to promote the interests of "big business."26 
Horwitz rejects this explanation. That fact alone might not be sur-
prising, but the manner of his rejection, in light of Transformation L 
surely is. Horwitz first claims that the treatment of corporations as 
"persons" harmonized with an older conception of the corporate form 
as being on the one hand an "artificial entity," created by the state and 
subject to state regulatory powers, and on the other an aggregate of 
the "vested rights" of individual shareholders. It was those rights, and 
those "persons," that were being recognized in the Santa Clara deci-
sion. Santa Clara was another way of saying that the Fourteenth 
Amendment codified the principle of protection for "vested rights" 
against state interference. 
The first step in Horwitz' argument assumes that the increased 
prominence of the corporate form in the American economy made no 
difference to the decision in Santa Clara. Indeed the "artificial entity" 
theory of the corporation presupposed that the state could control a 
number of corporate activities, such as mergers, dissolutions, the crea-
tion of joint stock holding companies, and the like. Treating the cor-
poration as a "person" within the Fourteenth Amendment did not, 
theoretically, affect the proposition that corporations were creatures of 
state sufferance. 
Horwitz then goes on to consider the appearance, in late nine-
teenth-century jurisprudence, of the theory that the corporation was a 
"natural" rather than an "artificial" entity that should be seen as a 
working group of individuals - most prominently the directors -
rather than as a creature of the state. This theory eventually became 
dominant in the early twentieth century and served to justify concen-
trations of corporate power, such as mergers, which were seen as com-
parable to arrangements between individuals. It replaced an earlier 
25. 118 U.S. 394 (1886). 
26. Horwitz cites an early statement of that view, CHARLES BEARD, CONTEMPORARY 
AMERICAN HISTORY, 1877-1913 (1914). See p. 66 n.4. He also cites Howard Jay Graham's 
well-known articles, Howard J. Graham, The "Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 47 YALE L.J. 371 (1938), and Howard J. Graham, Justice Field and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 52 YALE L.J. 851 (1943). Seep. 67 nn.4 & 7. 
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conception of the corporation as an aggregate of individuals, which 
had informed the decision in Santa Clara (pp. 100-06). 
The point of Horwitz' discussion of the rise of the "natural entity" 
theory is to show that only that theory was consistent with a permis-
sive attitude toward concentrated corporate power; the "artificial en-
tity" theory of the corporation presupposed that corporations required 
oversight by the state. Santa Clara, then, was not a decision solicitous 
of corporate power in the form it came to take in the late years of the 
nineteenth century, when general incorporation laws and mergers pro-
duced large-scale corporate enterprises that operated virtually free 
from governmental regulation. 
In his conclusion to the Santa Clara chapter, Horwitz summarizes 
his argument: 
In Santa Clara a natural entity theory was unnecessary for the imme-
diate task of constitutionalizing corporate property rights. An aggregate 
or partnership or contractual vision of the corporation - with well-es-
tablished roots in the Dartmouth College Case - was sufficient to focus 
the conceptual emphasis on the property rights of shareholders. Either a 
partnership or a natural entity view could equally successfully have sub-
verted the dominant artificial entity view of the corporation as a creature 
of the state. 
If the choice between a natural entity and a partnership theory was a 
toss-up when Santa Clara was decided, other nonconstitutional consider-
ations soon pushed American legal theory toward the entity conception. 
First, by 1900 it was no longer easy to conceive of shareholders as 
constituting the corporation. Changes in the conception of shareholder 
from active owner to passive investor weakened the evocative power of 
partnership theory. Moreover, the entity theory was better able to jus-
tify the weakened position of the shareholders in internal corporate gov-
ernance. Second, the partnership theory represented a threat to the 
legitimacy of limited liability of shareholders. The entity theory, by con-
trast, emphasized the distinction between corporations and partnerships. 
Third, while the partnership theory pushed in the direction of requiring 
shareholder unanimity for corporate mergers, the entity theory made the 
justification of majority rule possible. [p. 106; footnote omitted] 
This passage takes a markedly ambivalent approach toward the 
relationship between legal theory and its social context. First Horwitz 
appears to reject an "instrumentalist" approach - as exemplified by 
earlier treatments of the Santa Clara decision as solicitous of big busi-
ness - for one that emphasizes the autonomy of established legal cate-
gories, such as vested rights independent of state control. From that 
perspective, the statement in Santa Clara that corporations were per-
sons within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment was a kind of 
aside, simply indicating that the vested rights principle had been incor-
porated into the amendment. 
The next portions of the passage appear to modify the initial ap-
proach. While the Court in Santa Clara was "actively suspicious of 
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corporate power and the emergence of concentrated enterprise," those 
developments became facts of economic life in late nineteenth-century 
America (p. 105). Indeed those developments, Horwitz claims, 
"pushed American legal theory" toward the natural entity theory of 
corporate form (p. 106). He suggests that the natural entity theory 
was superior to other possible conceptual alternatives that likened the 
corporation to a group of individuals because it better explained and 
justified internal changes in corporations themselves, such as the in-
creased power of directors and the correspondingly weakened position 
of shareholders, the growth of majority rather than unanimity require-
ments for corporate mergers, and the importance of providing share-
holders with limited liability. That the natural entity theory came to 
be regarded as the principal theoretical justification for unregulated 
corporate activity was no accident, then. That theory was responsive 
to the conditions of late nineteenth-century corporate life. 
This portion of the passage offers a view of historical causation 
apparently at odds with the view offered in the earlier portion. In 
Santa Clara, the announced constitutional protection for corporations 
is a reflexive affirmation of an older principle of protection for the 
vested property rights of individuals. It not only bears no connection 
to the internal structure of late nineteenth-century corporations, in 
which directors rather than shareholders possessed decisionmaking 
power, it also embodies a consciousness that Horwitz suggests would 
have been hostile to increased growth and concentration in corporate 
enterprises. Doctrine, in short, is a product of the autonomous con-
ceptual structure of the legal profession. 
Yet once changes in the direction of concentration and 
majoritarian director-based power occur within the corporate form, 
those changes "push" legal doctrine to assume some forms rather than 
others. Here doctrine appears more in the form it assumed in Trans-
formation L as a response to or a reflection of developments in the 
economy and society as a whole. Indeed, Horwitz suggests that some 
doctrines whose claims to legitimacy were more deeply rooted in legal 
consciousness, such as the conceptions of corporations as partnerships 
or as contracts among individuals, lost stature because the natural en-
tity theory "was superior" in legitimating the structural developments 
in corporate governance that had actually taken place. Thus, one is 
not sure how to take the final sentence of Horwitz' chapter on Santa 
Clara: "[I]n . . . specific settings, one finds that legal theory does 
powerfully influence the direction of legal understanding" (p. 107). 
The causal relationship among theory, doctrine, and social context re-
mains elusive. 
Ill. THE NARRATIVE STRUCTURE OF TRANSFORMATION II 
The Santa Clara chapter appears as something of an interlude in 
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the narrative of Transformation IL As noted, the book opens with a 
chapter on the "Structure of Classical Legal Thought," followed by 
one entitled "The Progressive Attack on Freedom of Contract and Ob-
jective Causation." Those two chapters establish the narrative struc-
ture of the book, which traces a conflict between "classical" and 
"progressive" systems of legal thought. 27 While Chapter Two in-
troduces "progressive" critics of the "classical" system, it principally 
concerns the central roles of freedom of contract and objective causa-
tion in the architecture of classical thought. The chapter attempts to 
show how deeply rooted "objective" and "contractual" conceptions of 
legal relationships helped further the classical ideal of law as a neutral, 
nonpolitical entity and how "progressives" eventually came to point 
out that such conceptions ignored basic standards of social and eco-
nomic justice. By the end of the chapter, one develops a sense of an 
emerging "progressive" critique of the established "classical" regime, 
but one has only a dim sense of the architecture of "progressive" 
thought. 
In light of the first two chapters, the Santa Clara chapter appears 
as a somewhat isolated episode. After giving almost no attention to 
social and economic developments in the first two chapters, Horwitz 
begins the Santa Clara chapter by reciting some late nineteenth-cen-
tury developments, such as "three deep economic downturns," the 
growth of organized labor, "a series of major strikes," and the "strong 
showing of the Populists in the elections of 1892" (pp. 65-66). He then 
appears to endorse a causal connection between those developments 
and the emergence of a critique of "classical legal thought": 
If increasing inequality challenged the premise than an impersonal and 
self-executing market system could produce . . . a just distribution of 
wealth, the emergence of large, concentrated economic enterprises drew 
into question the very naturalness and necessity of decentralized eco-
nomic institutions. The project of redefining the market system to recog-
nize a legitimate role for the new corporate giants represented a central 
theme in American social thought at the tum of the century. It ex-
pressed no less than a crisis of legitimacy, testing the intimate relation-
ship between classical economic and social theories, on the one hand, 
and decentralized political institutions, on the other. [p. 66] 
The model of causation in this paragraph smacks of the model 
Horwitz employed in Transformation L Extralegal phenomena, such 
27. The terms classical and progressive are not defined and are obviously used by Horwitz as 
ideal types. The term classical, borrowed from Duncan Kennedy's "The Rise and Fall of Classi-
cal Legal Thought" (a portion of which was published in Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Histori-
cal Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 
1850-1940, 3 RES. L. & Soc. 3 (1980)), approximates what Horwitz called legal formalism in 
Transformation L Compare HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 252-53 with pp. 3-5. The term progres-
sive, while loosely identified with the progressive movement in national politics that surfaced in 
the early twentieth century, is primarily used to signify any strand of legal thought fundamen-
tally critical of the assumptions of classical thought. See pp. 4-5. 
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as "increasing inequality" and "the emergence of large, concentrated 
economic enterprises" affect legal thought. They "challenge" prem-
ises; they "draw into question" assumptions about the "naturalness 
and necessity" of political and economic arrangements. Their pres-
ence forces a redefinition of "the market system" to accommodate 
them and to secure their legitimacy. Indeed, the "crisis of legitimacy" 
that Horwitz identifies as "a central theme" in late nineteenth- and 
early twentieth-century social thought is one precipitated by the im-
perfect fit between "classical economic and social theories" and "polit-
ical and economic institutions." The passage strongly suggests that 
when such dissonance occurs, the theories have to adjust. As previ-
ously noted, his ambivalently presented analysis in the Santa Clara 
chapter is not inconsistent with that suggestion. 
When one encounters the next several chapters of Transformation 
II, however, one wonders how they square with the model of causa-
tion advanced in the Santa Clara chapter. The next four chapters -
on Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, "The Progressive Transformation 
in the Conception of Property," and the elements and legacy of legal 
realism - center overwhelmingly on intellectual developments and 
give almost no attention to extralegal phenomena. In the Holmes 
chapter, Horwitz dwells "at great length on intellectual history" (p. 
142), arguing- quite persuasively - that Holmes' "intellectual jour-
ney from The Common Law in 1881 to 'The Path of the Law' in 1897 
parallels a major change in American social, economic, and legal 
thought and in the structures of legitimacy in the two periods" (p. 
110). He makes no effort to explain why any "major change" oc-
curred. In the chapter on property, Horwitz takes up Wesley 
Hohfeld, Walter Wheeler Cook, Arthur Corbin, Morris Cohen, Rob-
ert Hale, and the "institutional economists" of the early twentieth cen-
tury in the course of an argument that property - previously 
characterized as a "private" entity whose existence was prior to soci-
ety - came to be seen as socially created and therefore a creature of 
"public law." In the two chapters on legal realism, Horwitz seeks to 
redefine that movement as "the culmination of the early-twentieth-
century attack on the claims of the late-nineteenth-century Classical 
Legal Thought to have produced an autonomous and self-executing 
system of legal discourse" (p. 193). Those chapters focus exclusively 
on the contributions of various "realist" thinkers, with emphasis on 
the degree to which those thinkers were "progressive" in their political 
orientation and "critical" in their methodology. 
The overwhelming emphasis in the chapters on intellectual contri-
butions makes Horwitz' cryptic statements about causation, which ap-
pear at scattered places in the chapters, seem all the more puzzling. In 
the chapter on Holmes, Horwitz notes that he has previously focused 
on "the vast institutional and ideological changes . . . that triggered 
the crisis of legitimacy at the tum of the century" and will now 
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"demonstrate how these changes affected the legal thought" of 
Holmes (p. 109). In the property chapter, he states that "[t]he basic 
problem of legal thinkers after the Civil War was how to articulate a 
conception of property that could accommodate the tremendous ex-
pansion in the variety of forms of ownership spawned by a dynamic 
industrial society" (p. 145). In one of the realist chapters, he asserts 
that the realists "were . . . much more self-conscious than their Pro-
gressive predecessors in attempting to legitimate social reform and so-
cial engineering in the emerging regulatory state" (p. 170). In another 
chapter, he states that, "[a]s American society grew more unequal and 
as the spectacular increase in corporate concentration undermined the 
belief in the naturalness of a decentralized, competitive market econ-
omy, social critics focused their attack on the assumptions behind an 
entirely process-oriented view of social justice" (p. 195). 
These statements approximate the views of historical causation 
and doctrinal change in the law advanced in Transformation /, yet 
they are accompanied by statements that seem to advance a different 
calculus toward those issues. Consider these passages from the open-
ing of Chapter Seven, "The Legacy of Legal Realism": 
The late-nineteenth-century system of Classical Legal Thought that 
Progressive jurisprudence after Lochner sought to dismantle was the cul-
mination of a set of ideas that had gradually crystallized over the course 
of a century. By the time Lochner was decided, these ideas had pro-
duced conceptions of law and legal reasoning that were designed to cre-
ate a sharp separation between law and politics, and between legal 
reasoning on the one hand and moral and political reasoning on the 
other. 
A conception of a self-executing, decentralized, competitive market 
economy was central to ideas oflegitimacy in all areas oflate-nineteenth-
century American thought. 
This vision of a self-executing, competitive market constituted the 
foundation of all efforts to create a sharp separation in legal thought 
between processes and outcomes, between means and ends, and between 
law and politics. Just as result-oriented economic policy was regarded as 
a non-neutral interference with the natural operations of the market, so 
too was orthodox legal thought stridently committed to avoiding polit-
ical scrutiny of outcomes. The law of contracts, the legal paradigm of 
voluntary market relations, was, as we have seen, especially resistant to 
any attempts to judge the fairness of contracts by their results. [pp. 193-
94; footnotes omitted] 
It is very difficult to square the view of the relationship between 
ideas and "legal thought" offered in these passages with Honvitz' ear-
lier comments on the causal connection between extralegal phenomena 
and legal doctrine. The passages characterize the "system" of "classi-
cal legal thought" described by Horwitz in the early chapters of Trans-
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formation II as "the culmination of a set of ideas" that are said to 
"produce[] ... conceptions of law and legal reasoning." The concep-
tions, or "visions," constitute the "foundations" of legal doctrines, 
such as the set of contract doctrines that elevated voluntariness and 
resisted scrutinies about the "fairness" of bargained-for transactions. 
In short, legal doctrine in these passages appears to be "caused" by 
"the culmination of a set of ideas." Moreover, those ideas do not seem 
to "come from" any extralegal forces in American society. The only 
force Horwitz identifies as driving the creation of "a system of legal 
thought that could separate law and politics" is the desire to prevent 
"tyranny of the majority," a desire Horwitz identifies with American 
thought "since the Revolution" (p. 193). 
By Chapter Seven of his narrative, then, Horwitz has identified 
himself with two views of causation, and two theories of the evolution 
of legal doctrine, that seem radically incompatible. One view, a hold-
over from Transformation L treats legal doctrine as derivative of 
"legal thought" but legal thought as responsive to extralegal phenom-
ena. The other view treats legal doctrine as the end product of "con-
ceptions" and "ideas" that have been embedded in the system of 
American legal thought virtually since its inception. While those con-
ceptions and ideas are loosely tied to extralegal forces, they make their 
principal impact as intellectual constructs. A "tyranny of the major-
ity" may or may not have been actually possible, given the political 
structure of nineteenth-century America; Horwitz' point seems to be 
that thinkers of that time nonetheless persistently feared that such a 
"tyranny" would come to pass. In making that point, Horwitz seems 
to be elevating an idea - persistent fear over time - to the level of 
causal agent. One may note that such an idea has nothing to do with 
markets, economic concentration, "inequalities" in the fabric of late 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century American life, or other extra-
legal phenomena. What, then, is one to make of Horwitz' earlier state-
ments attributing causal power to those forces? 
If one examines the narrative structure of Transformation II with 
Horwitz' two models of causation in mind, one finds a suggestive pat-
tern unfolding. The last chapter to advance a "sociological" model of 
causation is Chapter Five - on the "progressive" transformation of 
the conception of property - and the passage in which Horwitz em-
ploys that model recapitulates earlier coverage.28 Beginning with 
Chapter Six, on legal realism, Horwitz not only abandons all pretense 
28. The basic problem oflegal thinkers after the Civil War was how to articulate a concep-
tion of property that could accommodate the tremendous expansion in the variety of forms 
of ownership spawned by a dynamic industrial society. At a time when legal conceptions 
were still overwhelmingly derived from ideas about landed property, new forms of property 
developed and expanded that were increasingly difficult to fit into the conventional 
categories. 
P. 145. 
Note that even this passage is ambivalent: while legal conceptions "accommodate" extralegal 
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of surveying extralegal phenomena, but he largely abandons even the 
cryptic statements of "sociological" causation he had made in earlier 
chapters. 
The effect of this changed emphasis is that Transformation II be-
comes, overwhelmingly, a book about "legal thought," a history of 
legal ideas and the persons who promulgated them. From Chapter Six 
on, Horwitz not only presents analyses of several of the leading figures 
of twentieth-century legal education, but he includes biographical in-
formation about them. Increasingly, persons such as Karl Llewellyn, 
Roscoe Pound, Jerome Frank, Lon Fuller, Benjamin Cardozo, Robert 
Hale, Louis Brandeis, James Landis, Felix Frankfurter, Louis Jaffe, 
Learned Hand, and Herbert Wechsler occupy the forefront of the nar-
rative. Increasingly, Horwitz not only dissects the ideas of these 
figures, but comments on their personal characteristics and discusses 
tensions and clashes between them. At some parts in the narrative, 
Transformation II begins to resemble a "history of intellectuals." 
Moreover, the analytical energy of Transformation II appears to be 
redirected in its later chapters. In Horwitz' nineteenth-century chap-
ters, his emphasis was on demonstrating the architectonic integrity of 
"systems of thought": their premises, ideas, conceptions, and doctri-
nal formulas. Tensions were related to the collision between this ar-
chitectonic structure and extralegal developments that did not "fit" 
within it - developments that prompted doctrinal modification, aban-
donment and, finally, by the early twentieth century, the collapse of 
the entire structure. 
In the twentieth-century chapters, the "progressive" critique of 
this "classical" system is in place, but Horwitz does not present a com-
parable synthesis of the architecture of progressive thought. Indeed, 
his analysis suggests that from almost the moment of its inception, 
"progressive" thought has confronted internal tensions and dilemmas 
that have never been fully "solved." The insight of the "progressives" 
that legal categories and doctrines are socially created and thus contin-
gent leads to philosophical relativism and the possibility of epistemo-
logical nihilism. The "progressives' " concern with social inequalities 
and injustices has led to an attack on judicial lawmaking, which 
doubles back on itself when "democratic" branches of government 
produce "undemocratic" social policies, as in the area of race rela-
tions. 29 The "progressives'" confidence in "scientific expertise" runs 
into two difficulties - the elitist, undemocratic status of "experts," 
such as administrative agencies, and the alleged "value-free" nature of 
developments, they are nonetheless "derived from ideas." It is not clear where the original ideas 
"come from." 
29. The paradigm example is the racial segregation laws invalidated in Brown v. Board of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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"scientific" inquiry, which runs counter to modernist assumptions 
about the necessarily value-laden character of all forms of knowledge. 
Thus, while the history of late nineteenth-century legal thought in 
Transformation II is a history depicting the gradual abstraction and 
refinement of an all-encompassing "system" of interlocking legal ideas, 
conceptions, and doctrines, the history of twentieth-century legal 
thought is a series of episodes in which a "progressive" system seeks to 
find a common architecture in the face of opposition from its own 
adherents. For every "triumph" of "progressive" thought, from the 
critique on "classical" thought launched by the early twentieth-cen-
tury sociological jurists to the emergence of realism as the dominant 
mid-century American jurisprudential perspective, there are tempo-
rary "defeats" - such as the retreat of leading realists from cognitive 
relativism around the time of World War II, the emergence of internal 
opposition to realist-sponsored lawmaking by administrative agencies, 
and the rise of the "legal process" school of jurisprudence, which 
sought to domesticate realist insights and establish a new proceduralist 
ethic in law, uncannily like earlier nineteenth-century efforts to equate 
substantive and procedural fairness. 
One wonders why Horwitz' history turned out this way. One ex-
planation, of course, might be that an architectonic picture of a system 
of legal thought is not possible without a fair amount of distance be-
tween the historian and her subject, and that Horwitz and the rest of 
us are simply "too close" to "progressive" legal thought to be able to 
see it as a "system" capable of being decisively located in time. I 
would, however, offer a different explanation, one located in what I 
take to be Horwitz' ideological strategy in structuring the narrative he 
presents in Transformation IL 
IV. THE STRATEGY OF TRANSFORMATION II 
Recall the close connection between the methodology Horwitz em-
ployed in Transformation I and the metapolitical view of history with 
which he came to be associated after the publication of that book. The 
crucial term establishing that connection was the term instrumental-
ism. As Horwitz originally used the term in Transformation L it ap-
peared to refer to a point of view adopted by judges: a creative, policy-
oriented approach to legal doctrine that viewed law as an "instru-
ment" for facilitating social change and responding to the interests of 
various elites. Of course none of the judges whose decisions Horwitz 
examined in Transformation I called themselves "instrumentalists" or, 
for that matter, openly revealed that their decisionmaking calculus 
was "instrumentalist." The term itself was borrowed from twentieth-
century social history. 
In fact, the term instrumentalist signified a view of the world that 
was itself a product of the "progressive" critique Horwitz describes in 
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Transformation IL It was a view that assumed that the content of law 
bears a direct relationship to the demands of elites, that elites seek to 
shape law for their own purposes, that elites themselves respond to 
changes in the materialist structure of society, and that law, inevitably, 
will reflect those changes. When Horwitz asserted that early nine-
teenth-century American legal history was marked by the emergence 
of an "instrumentalist conception of law," that was another way of 
saying that the grounds for such a reading of early nineteenth-century 
American legal history were in place. Early nineteenth-century legal 
actors, in other words, were acting the way elites in American society 
act. They were molding doctrine to suit their purposes. 
Some of the criticism directed at Horwitz' analysis in Transforma-
tion I was concerned with an overreaching of his "instrumentalist" 
perspective. Some commentators suggested that, in characterizing late 
eighteenth-century legal actors as unconcerned with, or even unaware 
of, the law's capacities to respond to social change and the demands of 
elites, Horwitz was engaging in a thematic mischaracterization to 
highlight the "novelty" he claimed for the early nineteenth century.30 
Other commentators felt that Horwitz' readings of cases were skewed 
in favor of an "instrumentalist" reading and argued that interpreta-
tions were possible that did not conform to Horwitz' hypothesis.31 
Still other critics focused on Horwitz' most generalized claims, which 
stressed the close relationship between legal and commercial elites in 
nineteenth-century America, and argued that Horwitz had produced 
no real evidence that such a relationship existed beyond the mere sup-
position that those seeking or holding economic power would enlist 
the support of those with authority in the legal system.32 
Taken as a whole, these critiques of Transformation I appeared to 
claim that Horwitz had engaged in a kind of reification. He was the 
"instrumentalist," insofar as he believed that, in the worlds of political 
economy and the law, elites functioned in a certain fashion. Being 
such, he "saw" evidence of that tendency in the early nineteenth cen-
tury. Because undoubted evidence of both social and doctrinal change 
existed in that century - one could construct parallels between 
changes in extralegal phenomena and changes in doctrine - all that 
was necessary was to advance a metaexplanation for those changes. 
Metaexplanations cannot fully be proved or disproved; at some level 
they rest on whether others in an interpretive community find them 
intuitively sound. Horwitz' "instrumentalism" ultimately served as 
30. See, e.g., R. Randall Bridwell, Theme v. Reality in American Legal History: A Commen· 
tary on Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 and on the Common Law in 
America, 53 IND. L.J. 449, 456-57 (1978). 
31. See, e.g., John P. Reid, A Plot Too Doctrinaire, 55 TEXAS L. REV. 1307, 1309-10 (1977). 
32. See, e.g., Grant Gilmore, From Tort to Contract: Industrialization and the Law, 86 YALE 
L.J. 788, 794-95 (1977); Harry N. Scheiber, Back to "the Legal Mind"? Doctrinal Analysis and 
the History of Law, 5 REvs. AM. Hlsr. 458, 463-64 (1977). 
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the metaexplanation of Transformation L The success of the book 
suggests that Horwitz was not the only instrumentalist around. 
At one level, then, Transformation I contained an analytical strat-
egy; it "set up" instrumentalism as the "best possible" explanatory 
theory to make sense of early nineteenth-century legal history.33 Can 
Horwitz be said to have a comparable strategic plan in Transformation 
II? What is being "set up" in his narrative? 
Here the narrative structure of Transformation II can provide 
some clues. We have previously noted that Horwitz' attention in the 
first portion of his narrative is principally directed toward the "sys-
tem" of "classical" legal thought, which he describes as becoming in-
creasingly more abstract and category-ridden in the nineteenth 
century. By the Santa Clara chapter and the chapter on Holmes, the 
"classical" system is pictured as having sown the seeds of its own de-
struction, and the assault on the system comes from two directions: 
"outside," as new forms of economic enterprise conflict with classical 
assumptions about the naturalness of a decentralized economy, and 
"inside," as perceptive commentators such as Holmes unearth the sys-
tem's doctrinal fictions and contradictions. These chapters pave the 
way for the emergence of an alternative system - that of "progres-
sive" thought - which is introduced in Chapter Five and developed in 
Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight, and whose uneasy future is the subject 
of Chapter Nine. 
I also noted, however, that Horwitz does not present the "progres-
sive" system of thought in the same fashion as he did the "classical" 
system. From the outset, Horwitz depicts the "progressive" system's 
struggle to reconcile its own contradictory tendencies, such as the con-
flict between "cognitive relativism" and scientific "objectivity." "Pro-
gressive" legal thought, in Horwitz' narrative, never acquires the 
architectonic integrity of "classical" legal thought. Instead of empha-
sizing its adherents' shared premises, Horwitz emphasizes their 
differences. 
Nonetheless, Horwitz' narrative does invest "progressive" thought 
with its own kind of integrity. This integrity is linear rather than ar-
chitectonic; it comes from asserted connections between various twen-
tieth-century manifestations of a "progressive" jurisprudential 
sensibility. In the end, "progressive" thought becomes a recurrent fea-
ture of twentieth-century American jurisprudence, one side in a per-
petual debate between those who continue to seek a radical separation 
oflaw from politics and those who insist that no separation is possible. 
The result is to elevate the successive "progressive" attacks on ortho-
33. In the preface to Transformation IL Horwitz says that "I still aspire to give the best 
possible explanation," even though "[a]s one sees both theories and causes as more contingent, 
one's belief in one's own objectivity is drawn into question." P. viii. 
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dox jurisprudence from isolated episodes to examples of the presence 
of an alternative intellectual "system." 
Horwitz employs three narrative devices in his effort to elevate the 
place of "progressive" thought. The first is to emphasize the connec-
tions, rather than the differences, between the first wave of "progres-
sive" challenges to the "classical" system - the contributions of 
Roscoe Pound and other "sociological jurists" in the years around 
World War I- and the realist movement of the late 1920s and 1930s. 
As Horwitz puts it, "[f]or many purposes, it is best to see Legal Real-
ism as simply a continuation of the reformist agenda of early-twenti-
eth-century Progressivism. Too much has been made of the 
distinction between Legal Realism and what Roscoe Pound called 'so-
ciological jurisprudence' before World War I" (p. 169). His point is 
that, whatever differences existed between the sociological jurists and 
the realists, both groups firmly rejected the premise of "classical" 
thought that law could serve as a neutral, nonpolitical force. The ef-
fect of the coupling of sociological jurisprudence and realism in Hor-
witz' narrative is that a "progressive" version of legal thought 
occupies a continuous chronological existence from the years before 
World War I to at least the years after the Second World War, when 
realism was significantly modified by process theory.34 
Horwitz' second narrative device is to emphasize the "cognitive 
relativism" of "progressive" thought and to insist that this dimension 
of "progressive" legal ideology, particularly as it related to realism, 
has been widely misunderstood. In order to emphasize the "cogni-
tive" aspects of realism, Horwitz reexamines the pivotal role of Karl 
Llewellyn in identifying the realist movement as an intellectual entity 
and concludes that Llewellyn's own preoccupations - with making a 
"list" of realists and with emphasizing the connections between real-
ism and value-free social science - have been appropriated by histori-
ans. The consequence has been a distortion of the thrust of realism. 
At one point Horwitz summarizes his claims about Llewellyn and his 
effect on subsequent perceptions of the realists: 
Llewellyn's effort to define Realism in terms of a relatively coherent and 
34. Because some of my earlier work is cited as an example of scholarship making "too 
much" of the distinction between sociological jurisprudence and realism, I should note that in 
Tort Law in America I offered a reading of the relationship between sociological jurisprudence 
and realism much closer to Horwitz'. The following paragraph captures that reading: 
Indeed, when one considers Realism in the context of broad intellectual developments in 
the early twentieth century, and contrasts those developments with prevailing late nine-
teenth-century intellectual trends, it is possible to formulate a definition of Realism that 
incorporates sociological jurisprudence. The Realist movement, in its successive stages, was 
an extended critique of the conceptualist orientation of late nineteenth-century jurispru-
dence, with the sociological jurisprudes primarily criticizing the social and political conse-
quences of that orientation, and the self-styled "Realists" primarily criticizing 
conceptualism's underlying philosophical assumptions. 
G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 70-71 (1980) 
(footnotes omitted). 
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systematic methodology has resulted both in a de-emphasis of the sub-
stantive political commitments of the Realists - their connection to the 
movement for political reform - and in a substantial over-emphasis on a 
now largely discredited strand of positivist and behavioralistic social sci-
ence that has deprived us of the true richness of the intellectual and 
political heritage of Realism. [p. 172] 
In calling for a recognition of the realists as political reformers and 
"cognitive relativists," Horwitz prepares the way for his third narra-
tive device, which he employs to describe the "legacy" of realism. By 
identifying the realists as in the "progressive" tradition of political re-
form, Horwitz associates them with a point of view hostile to the 
"classical" system's effort to separate law and politics. He can thus 
show that mid-twentieth-century efforts to subvert or absorb realism, 
such as the work of what he calls the legal process school, 35 amount to 
efforts to reassert the law-politics dichotomy. At the same time, by 
identifying the tension in realism between cognitive relativism and 
value-free social science, Horwitz is able to show that the realists 
themselves were searching for some version of methodological "neu-
trality" that could function as a barrier against the nihilist implica-
tions of perspectivalism. The realists' own ambivalence toward the 
values of objectivity and neutrality made them more vulnerable to neo-
"classical" critics in the years of the Second World War, when relativ-
ism of all kinds seemed close to treason. 
When one focuses on this last narrative device of Horwitz', and 
considers the connections among the three devices, the outlines of an 
interpretive strategy begin to appear. By presenting "progressive" 
thought as a continuous, but conflicted, twentieth-century alternative 
to "classical" thought, Horwitz both legitimizes the "progressive" tra-
dition and demonstrates its vulnerability to "classical" counterattack. 
By identifying the principal conflict within "progressive" thought as 
that between epistemological ("cognitive") relativism and a search for 
methodological objectivity or neutrality, Horwitz locates the source of 
"progressive" thought's vulnerability to "classical" opposition. That 
source is the very fascination with neutrality and objectivity that 
drives "classical" thought to attempt a separation between law and 
politics. The purpose of that attempted separation, Horwitz regularly 
reminds us, was to establish law as a neutral force, above the passions 
of humans and the tyranny of the majority. In a sense, value-free 
methodologies played the same role for "progressives." They served 
as a brake on the assumed tendency of humans to make over legal 
institutions and concepts in accordance with their own predilections. 
The effect of this portrait of the interaction of "classical" and "pro-
35. Horwitz does not actually use the term legal process school until very late in his narrative, 
several pages after he has introduced and discussed the contributions of process theorists. Com-
pare p. 269 with pp. 253-55. 
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gressive" thought is to invest both systems with a certain normative 
baggage. Twentieth-century jurisprudential "schools" seeking to sub-
vert or to modify "progressive" movements such as realism come to be 
seen as neo-"classical" in their orientation, and thus come to take on 
the full panoply of Horwitz' earlier characterizations of "classical" 
thought. They appear as category-ridden, fixated on the goals of neu-
trality, and unresponsive to social injustice. Such is the characteriza-
tion Horwitz advances of the "legal process school." 
"Progressive schools," viewed through Horwitz' lens, benefit from 
the added stature of an alternative jurisprudential "tradition" - ex-
tending for the entire balance of the twentieth century - and also 
demonstrate a recurrent fixation with methodological objectivity and 
neutrality that has been a source of weakness for them. Because Hor-
witz announces that value-free social science is "now largely discred-
ited," continued efforts on the part of "progressive" thinkers to search 
for neutral methodological principles are in vain (p. 172). The implicit 
message, for such thinkers, is that they should proudly reaffirm the 
"cognitive relativism" of their heritage, drop all pretenses of achieving 
neutrality or objectivity, and join battle with the neoclassicists. 
At this point in the book, Horwitz is talking about the present, as 
he has, in a sense, been doing all along. His final chapter makes more 
explicit the lessons readers are to draw from his narrative. The first is 
that yet another effort to separate law from politics, the legal process 
school, encountered a "swift decline of its influence" - and ultimately 
its "demise" - after the mid- l 960s (p. 269). Given the structure of 
Horwitz' narrative, the causes for the decline of process theory are not 
hard to find. Process theory made an investment in the search for 
"neutral principles," sought to equate proceduralism with substantive 
justice, and adopted the "sharp distinction between facts and values 
characteristic of ethical positivism" (p. 270). These characteristics of 
the movement relegated it to the status of "formalistic" jurisprudential 
schools that, in one form or another, sought to reassert or to revive the 
separation of law from politics (p. 271). Horwitz' narrative suggests 
that such efforts are foredoomed because they start from a misguided 
premise. 
As a result of the collapse of the legal process school, "[t]hree dif-
ferent intellectual movements have struggled for ascendancy" in con-
temporary American jurisprudence (p. 269). The next lesson of 
Horwitz' narrative determines which of those movements bears the 
greatest promise. 
Here Horwitz' strategy is twofold. After identifying the three 
movements competing for influence - "rights theories," law and eco-
nomics, and CLS - he seeks to delegitimate the first two movements, 
but at the same time to avoid identifying himself too openly as a parti-
san of the third. By avoiding an open declaration of his affinity for 
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CLS, Horwitz remains faithful to his statement in the first paragraph 
of his conclusion that "for the historian, a degree of perspective and 
distance remains essential if history is not to become simply an exten-
sion of current controversies about law" (p. 269). Nonetheless, one 
could argue that his entire narrative has been "set up" to make the 
connection of CLS with the "progressive" tradition of twentieth-cen-
tury American jurisprudence appear "natural" and "necessary." 
Horwitz' first tactic, in his discussion of the competing intellectual 
movements, is to dismiss the claims to prominence of "rights theory." 
He does this in an oblique manner, by devoting little space to those 
claims. He notes that "rights theory" is not a new phenomenon; it 
surfaced during the Second World War, "in reaction to the horrors of 
totalitarianism," and again during the Warren Court years. He also 
notes that a "property-centered version" of rights theory has been re-
vived recently by proponents of a "right-wing libertarian legal philoso-
phy" (p. 269). This history suggests that rights theory has a protean 
character and can support any philosophical point of view. "[I]n 
American history," he notes, "natural rights has equally served both 
abolitionists and the defenders of the rights of ownership in human 
and non-human property" (p. 271). In short, rights theory appears to 
be too "malleab[le]" to be of much use (p. 269). 
Horwitz' efforts at discrediting law and economics are more exten-
sive. Here he has a formidable opponent, not only because of the 
symbiotic relationship between welfare economics and the neocon-
servatism of the 1980s, but also because of the claims of members of 
the law-and-economics movement to be "the rightful heirs to Legal 
Realism" (p. 270). The realists, those claims suggest, were essentially 
seeking to get beyond legal doctrine to the truths of social science; by 
revealing the truths of the social science most relevant for legal trans-
actions, law and economics has completed that search. 
Here the groundwork Horwitz lays in his narrative of realism 
proves particularly helpful. He points out again that Llewellyn's char-
acterization of realism as a " 'methodology' or 'technology' " was in-
complete and misleading, reminds us that "there was an entire body of 
Legal Realist work that explicitly rejected both ethical positivism and 
the alliance between Legal Realism and value-free social science," and 
repeats that "the greatest and most enduring contribution of Realism 
was its early recognition of the implications of cultural modernism 
and, in particular, of cognitive relativism for legal thought" (p. 270). 
The last claim about realism, in particular, makes any connection with 
law and economics "ironic." The realists devoted their energy to dem-
onstrating the contingent nature of social phenomena; law and eco-
nomics seeks to "reestablish[ ] . . . Classical Legal Thought's reified 
picture of the market as neutral, natural, and necessary" (p. 270). 
Law and economics is thus, if anything, the heir to the legal pro-
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cess school, another "effort to separate law and politics in American 
culture, one more expression of the persistent yearning to find an 
olympian position from which to objectively cushion the terrors of so-
cial choice" (p. 271). That the "neutrality" dimension of law and eco-
nomics resides in "the market" rather than in formal principles of 
legal doctrine makes no difference. 
Thus, if any contemporary movement can claim descent from real-
ism and other movements in the "progressive" tradition, it would ap-
pear to be CLS. Horwitz is notably cryptic on this point, limiting his 
discussion to the statement that "the strand of cognitive relativism" he 
has prominently associated with realism has been "revived and ex-
tended" by the CLS movement (pp. 270-71). That is all he says, but in 
his final paragraph in Transformation II, when he speaks of "tran-
scend[ing] the American fixation with sharply separating law from 
politics," his choice to use the word transcend, a common one in the 
discourse of CLS, is no accident (p. 272). 
V. CONCLUSION: TRANSFORMING AMERICAN HISTORY 
If the term that formed the core of the narrative of Transformation 
I was instrumentalist, the term that forms the core of the narrative of 
Transformation II is reify. "Nowhere," Horwitz writes in his conclu-
sion, "has the process of reification been more pronounced than in 
American legal theory" (p. 271). By reify Horwitz means "make 
real," in the sense that one makes a "self-fulfilling prophecy" come 
true: one reads the experience of the past as confirming propositions 
that one already takes to be self-evident. "Classical" legal thought 
was a system based on reification; its abstract legal categories created 
an "architecture" that ensured that legal doctrines would confirm the 
primacy of value judgments already made. The bright lines drawn, for 
example, between property "affected by a public interest" and other 
kinds of property were possible for two reasons - because "property" 
itself was taken as an entity preceding the organization of society and 
because distinctions between the "private" and "public" spheres of life 
were assumed to be "natural" and settled. 
When Horwitz turns from "classical" to "progressive" thought, a 
different sort of reification occurs. Instead of identifying common 
premises and demonstrating how the entire structure of a body of 
thought functioned to reify those premises, Horwitz identifies distinc-
tive features of "progressive" thought - he calls them strands - but 
does not attempt to synthesize them. On the contrary, he presents the 
strands as not easily reconcilable and the "progressive" tradition as 
being characterized by a simultaneous pursuit of apparently contradic-
tory themes. 
We have seen that three strands of "progressive" thought receive 
prominence in Horwitz' account. The first is a fundamental dissatis-
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faction with "classical" thought, with respect to both its methodologi-
cal assumptions and its political agenda. "Progressives" were those 
who found the legal outcomes produced by "classical" doctrines sub-
stantively unjust and the doctrinal system that produced them episte-
mologically misguided. One theme uniting "progressives" was the 
belief that legal orthodoxy was simply wrongheaded. 
A second strand of "progressive" thought is what Horwitz calls 
cognitive relativism. He associates this posture with the numerous 
works by "progressive" scholars suggesting that legal categories, 
thought by classicists to be natural and necessary~ were socially cre-
ated and contingent. The "discoveries" by "progressives" that causa-
tion was multiple rather than monocausal, or policy-driven rather 
than objective, or that property was the creation of social arrange-
ments rather than antecedent ·to them all followed from an altered 
view of the process by which humans react to experience. The "classi-
cal" view of that process had emphasized the inevitability of certain 
universal truths - the primacy of property, the competitive .instincts 
of humans - that formed the "realities" of experience. In contrast, 
the "progressive" view took those "truths" as socially created, and 
thus adopted a more comp~ex posture toward the relationship between 
perception and experience. 
The strand of "cognitive relativism" in "progressive" thought har-
monized well with the "critical" strand in that progressives' substan-
tive attacks on orthodox legal doctrines were reinforced by their 
insight that those doctrines were not inevitable and universal. But the 
third strand of "progressive" thought emphasized in Horwitz' narra-
tive fits less well with the other two. It is enthusiasm for behavioralist 
social science. While Horwitz identifies several "progressive" thinkers 
as explicitly or implicitly subscribing to Holmes' dictum that "the man 
of the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics,"36 
he does not spend much time suggesting why twentieth-century "pro-
gressive" theorists should have been attracted to the social sciences. A 
fair amount of other scholarly literature has done so, however, and 
Horwitz cites some of that literature, so we may take him as having 
incorporated its arguments by reference. Briefly, the social sciences 
have been attractive to twentieth-century scholars because they seem 
to provide general "covering" laws - based on observable human be-
havior - as explanations for social change, and are at the same time 
not grounded on theological or religious assumptions. They thus re-
tain the nineteenth-century fixation with "scientific" explanations of 
the universe without retaining the theological dimensions of nine-
teenth-century "science."37 Horwitz points out the number of "pro-
36. OLIVER w. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 187 (1920). 
37. Among the relevant literature cited by Horwitz on the collapse of religious-based "scien-
tific" explanations and the growth of modern social science are MARY 0. FURNER, ADVOCACY 
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gressive" theorists who began with the assumption that social science 
methodology could be used to reform the law to meet "progressive" 
political and moral goals, but ultimately concluded that it should be 
"value-free" (pp. 209-10). 
In Horwitz' narrative, this strand of "progressive" thought does 
not reinforce the other two. Indeed, it is the source of some of the 
deepest contradictions in the "progressive" epistemological system. In 
the hands of Llewellyn and other "constructive" progressives, the ca-
nons of objectivity and neutrality - originally identified with social 
science - become devices for "subordinat[ing] political and moral 
passion to social science expertise" and for "push[ing] the behavioral 
social sciences in directions that ultimately dulled the critical edge of 
Realism itself" (pp. 209-10; footnotes omitted). In this effort the 
"progressive" enthusiasts for social science were exhibiting what Hor-
witz calls a "preoccup[ation in twentieth-century American thought] 
with finding a method that can either determine values objectively or 
avoid the value question entirely" (p. 210). The turn to social science 
in the twentieth century, he believes, was "part of this general effort to 
find alternative forms of legitimation amid the decline of religious be-
lief and the disintegration of an orthodox Darwinian paradigm" (p. 
210). 
The "progressive" alternative tradition of twentieth-century juris-
prudence thus emerges as deeply conflicted. Alongside its critical and 
relativistic strands rests its social science strand; alongside the reform-
ist energy of sociological jurisprudence and "cognitive" realism rest 
"scientific" realism, positivism, and the legal process school. Instead 
of pressing its critical and relativistic insights to their full potential, 
the tradition has vacillated between periods of great creative energy 
and periods where it has struggled to make the claim that a jurispru-
dence was objective or value-free. 
Now consider the contemporary jurisprudential universe, as Hor-
witz describes it in his concluding chapter. Three competing schools 
struggle for "ascendancy." Of those, one, the "rights" school, appears 
to rest on the proposition that "natural rights" has some determinate 
content, even though "rights" arguments, Horwitz suggests, have been 
advanced by theorists at all points on the political continuum in sup-
port of a great variety of conflicting claims. Rights theory appears to 
be an effort to "determine values objectively," an effort which Hor-
witz' history suggests is doomed to failure. 
Law al_ld economics, on the other hand, appears to be adopting 
AND 0BJECfIVITY: A CRISIS IN THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE, 
1865-1905 (1975); THOMAS L. HAsKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 
(1977); DAVID A. HOLLINGER, MORRIS R. COHEN AND THE SCIENTIFIC IDEAL (1975); ED-
WARD A. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1973); and DOROTHY Ross, THE 
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1991). 
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both of the strategies employed by past twentieth-century jurispruden-
tial movements. On the one hand, law and economics posits the exist-
ence of an objective methodology by which human relationships can 
be studied, because all humans, at bottom, are utility-maximizers. 
Having determined the calculus of utility maximization to be the base-
line for human decisionmaking, law and economics argues for a kind 
of neutrality - or at least an indifference - to the consequences of 
aggregate maximization. Thus, the process by which one observes 
utility maximization is objective, but the "value" that individuals 
place on the choices they make in the process is subjective. One is 
therefore precluded from intervening in the process: first, because 
such intervention would be inconsistent with the objectivity canon; 
second, because there is no objective way of evaluating outcomes other 
than to say outcomes are what individual utility-maximizers "want." 
Law and economics thus appears to stand squarely in the twenti-
eth-century positivist tradition of retreat to a constructed objectivity, 
the very tradition that in Horwitz' narrative has produced continual 
moral abdication. What of the remaining intellectual movement? 
Horwitz may be cryptic, but the lessons of his narrative are clear. The 
most powerful features of the "progressive" alternative tradition -
the features Horwitz has labored hardest to unearth - are its "criti-
cal" attitude toward orthodoxy, its cognitive relativism, and its persis-
tent resistance to efforts to establish legal doctrine as neutral, natural, 
or necessary, as distinguished from socially constructed, contingent, 
and time-bound. In the "progressive" caricatures of "mechanical ju-
risprudence" and in the realist attacks on "conceptualism," one sees 
the same impulses that produced critical "trashings" of centrist "lib-
eral" doctrine. In the "cultural modernism" of the early "progres-
sives," one sees something like the "irrationalist" critical attacks on 
process theory. In short, one has a sense that another "progressive" 
wave has swelled. If only this wave can avoid the shoals of positivism; 
if only critical thought can abandon the practice of "hid[ing] behind 
unhistorical and abstract universalisms in order to deny, even to itself, 
its own political and moral choices" (p. 272). 
If . . . . One is struck by Horwitz' comments, at the beginning of 
his Santa Clara chapter, that one of the precursors of "progressive" 
theory was "[t]he gradual acceptance of the reality of multiple causa-
tion" (p. 65) and by his statement in the preface to Transformation II 
that he inhabits "[a] complex, multi-factored interdependent world," a 
"world of complex multiple causation" (p. viii). One wonders whether 
the "reality of multiple causation" is any more capable of being objec-
tified than any other "fact" of history. One wonders, in general, just 
what is being "reified" in the narrative of Transformation IL There is 
a sense of a narrator alternatively horrified and fascinated at the ca-
pacity of "classical" thought to achieve architectonic integrity. At the 
same time, one cannot escape noticing the self-denial of that same nar-
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rator, alternatively energized and deflated by the critical brilliance of 
the "progressive" theorists' insights and the recurrent lapses of Ameri-
can jurisprudence, whether "progressive" or orthodox, into episodes 
of neoclassicism. In a sense, Horwitz appears to believe that if his 
efforts to reveal the critical and cognitive dimensions of "progressive" 
thought are appreciated, others will be inspired, and if his efforts to 
warn against the dangers of naive faith in social science or some other 
positivist escape mechanism are heeded, others may avoid them in the 
future. At the same time there is a sense of the inexorable pattern of 
retreat to objectivity - or avoidance once a critical project is pushed 
too far or appears too relativistic in its sweep - a sense that, for all 
the illuminating efforts of "progressive" theorists, American jurispru-
dence will continue to bury its head in the sand. 
Horwitz has now made two efforts at "transforming" American 
legal history. It is a commentary on his stature and on his self-aware-
ness that his second effort implicitly abandons the "instrumentalist" 
motif of his first despite that motif's capacity to energize many of his 
contemporaries. His second effort is more self-conscious, but no less 
bold. Nuance and detail are sacrificed, and new linear relationships 
developed, in the service of a highly purposive narrative. Sociological 
jurists and realists are made to look more like critical theorists than 
they ever really were, and the system of orthodoxy becomes almost 
pristine in its self-containment. 
Despite Horwitz' occasional retreats to the stance of the profes-
sional historian, reifi.cation is the motif of Transformation II in ways 
that involve its author as well as its subject. Not only the "classical" 
theorists build their doctrinal world according to their own assump-
tions; Horwitz builds his narrative according to his. This comment is 
not meant wholly as a criticism; there is no escaping subjectivity and 
time-boundedness, in historians as in other humans. The structure of 
Transformation II "sets up" progressives to "win" our approval, and 
by doing so establishes CLS as the most promising of the contempo-
rary legal intellectual movements; Horwitz could hardly have written 
the book differently. Because of its inherent structural limitations, one 
can hardly say his narrative is definitive - but definitiveness presup-
poses an objectivity to historical analysis and a universality to histori-
cal interpretation that, as cultural moderns, we seem fated not to 
accept. 
Still, Horwitz' evolving posture in the Transformation sequence 
appears to have left him, and the rest of us, in an awkward predica-
ment. The unifying feature of Transformation I was its relentless in-
strumentalism, its relatively simple view of historical causation. In 
Transformation II, Horwitz has come to recognize that history resists 
monocausal explanations and that the choice of a causal motif on the 
part of a liistorian is to an important extent personal and subjective. 
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Put another way, by Transformation II Horwitz has come to recog-
nize that a good deal of authorial reifi.cation was going on in Transfor-
mation L 
What follows from this recognition? In his preface Horwitz con-
fronts the possibility that, in a world in which historical explanations, 
and theoretical statements of all kinds, are socially constructed and 
contingent, historical scholarship could become ''just my story, with 
all the connotations of skepticism and subjectivity that the word 
'story' implies" (p. viii). He believes, however, that this predicament 
is not inevitable so long as historians "aspire to give the best possible 
explanation" of their subjects (p. viii). 
But where does this explanation come from? And how does one 
know it is the "best possible" one? Transformation II is distressingly 
cryptic on both those questions. While rejecting monocausal causa-
tion, Horwitz returns in the early chapters of Transformation II to the 
model of causation he employed in Transformation L reciting extrale-
gal phenomena and suggesting that those phenomena "pushed" or 
"pulled" legal doctrine in various directions. After the introduction to 
Chapter Five, however, he abandons attention to extralegal develop-
ments, so that one gets the impression that if anything is "causing" the 
various twists and turns of "progressive" thought in the 1920s, 1930s, 
1940s, and 1950s, it is the inherent contradictions within that body of 
thought itself. Such an impression would comport with quite a differ-
ent theory of the causal relationship among theory, doctrine, and con-
text in the law. That theory might emphasize the degree to which 
given intellectual "movements" or "schools" are fated, because of 
their culturally determined governing assumptions, to slide over philo-
sophical difficulties and to assert "solutions" to contested social or 
legal issues that subsequent generations, having abandoned the gov-
erning assumptions, find problematic. Under such a theory, changes 
in legal doctrine over time emerge as the "inevitable" product of dis-
tinctive generational mixes of cultural experiences and epistemological 
premises. Horwitz, however, never advances any such theory. He 
simply stops talking explicitly about causation. 
Lacking any explicit explanatory theory of the developments sur-
veyed in Transformation IL one has no answer to the question 
whether Horwitz has given the "best possible explanation" of those 
developments. What one has instead is a sense of the metaexplanatory 
structure of Horwitz' narrative. One feels that he presents his subjects 
in order to forge connections between CLS and other twentieth-cen-
tury "progressive" jurisprudential movements, and in orcfer to dis-
credit the claims of other contemporary schools, especially law and 
economics, to stand as the "heirs" to those movements. 
In short, one feels strongly that Horwitz would like the history of 
twentieth-century legal America to be read in a certain way. After 
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reading Transformation II, however, one has no basis for determining 
whether it should be read in that way. This makes all the more puz-
zling Horwitz' decision to "end[] the story around 1960" and thus not 
to include "the breathtaking changes in postwar academic legal 
thought" that came with the collapse of process jurisprudence (p. 
269). Horwitz identifies that decision with his desire to act as a "histo-
rian," for whom "a degree of perspective and distance remains essen-
tial if history is not to become simply an extension of current 
controversies" (p. 269). That statement is puzzling because the over-
whelming "message" of Horwitz' history of twentieth-century legal 
thought is that history is an extension of current controversy; history 
helps to explain and even provisionally to resolve that controversy. 
So the historian ends up in a considerable predicament after Trans-
formation IL He has no "objective" theory, whether based on histori-
cal causation or something else, with which to explain the past. Yet he 
needs to eschew subjectivity and preserve "distance" from his subjects. 
It is not clear how subjectivity can be resisted, and distance preserved, 
without some criteria for evaluating which of a myriad possible expla-
nations for past developments to prefer. It seems that the only way to 
establish such criteria is for historians to make clear to their readers 
which explanations they have chosen to emphasize and why those ex-
planations are superior to others. In so doing, historians return them-
selves and their readers to the basic problems of the relationships 
among text, context, and interpretation that form the heart of the 
scholarly enterprise. One may find this suggestion distressingly pro-
saic. But it at least does not seek to evade the problems of distinguish-
ing historical scholarship from storytelling, problems that 
"transformative" methodologies appear designed to avoid. 
